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Abstract:  
We consider the implications of ethical behaviour on the effect of a redistributive tax-
transfer system. In choosing their labour supplies, individuals take into account 
whether their tax liabilities correspond to what they view as ethically acceptable. If tax 
liabilities are viewed as ethically acceptable, a taxpayer behaves ethically, does not 
distort her behaviour, and chooses to work as if she were not taxed. On the other 
hand, if ethical behaviour results in tax liabilities that exceed those that are ethically 
acceptable, she behaves egoistically (partially or fully), distorts her behaviour, and 
chooses her labour supply taking into account the income tax. We establish 
taxpayers’ equilibrium behaviour and obtain that labour supply is less elastic when 
taxpayers may behave ethically than when they act egoistically. We characterize and 
compare the egoistic voting equilibrium linear tax schedules under potentially ethical 
and egoistic behaviour. We also compare our results to those obtained under 
altruism, an alternative benchmark. 
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1. Introduction
It is apparent that in many social situations, individuals do not behave as a selfish ‘homo oe-
conomicus’ would behave. On the contrary, many studies suggest that individuals exhibit care
for others in their behaviour. In his survey paper on psychology and economics, Rabin (1998)
highlights many examples, both inside and outside of laboratories, where people demonstrate be-
haviour that departs from pure self-interest. Experimental evidence includes Andreoni (1995b),
who finds that individuals avoid free-riding in public good provision games due to some form
of kindness, and Camerer and Thaler (1995), who discover non-selfish behaviour in ultimatum
and dictator games. Non-experimental evidence of benevolent behaviour includes the cases of
tipping studied by Lynn and Grassman (1990), fairness considerations in the determination of
wages considered by Blinder and Choi (1990), and, more obviously, charitable donations dis-
cussed by Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) or Andreoni (1998). Fong (2001) reports evidence from
surveys that people do indeed care for non-related individuals in society.
Given that individuals display benevolent behaviour in some dimensions of their economic life,
could it be that they also display such behaviour when paying taxes? In this context, it is useful
to distinguish tax evasion from tax avoidance (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). Tax evasion
involves illegal behaviour, such as under-reporting income to the tax authorities, while tax
avoidance involves reducing one’s tax liabilities by entirely legal means, such as tax planning or
simply substituting non-taxable activity (leisure, household production, consumption of untaxed
goods) for taxable activity (earning income, consuming taxable goods). According to Andreoni,
Erard and Feinstein (1998), the answer to the question posed above is affirmative in the case of
tax evasion: indeed, that is regarded as being the main problem with the conventional theory of
tax evasion which treats it as a problem in portfolio choice. In their survey paper, they highlight
the fact that tax compliance around the world is surprisingly high given the low probabilities
of audit and the size of the sanctions. For example, in 1988 almost 70% of U.S. households
chose not to evade taxes. Yet, the audit rate over that period was only 0.8%, and typically the
penalties applied were of the order of only 20% of the unpaid taxes.1
There are various potential explanations for such a puzzle. Erard and Feinstein (1994) have
suggested that it is the shame of getting caught. Others, like Gordon (1989), argue that there
is an endogenous social norm, whereby individuals experience a psychic cost of tax evasion
which depends on the level of tax evasion in the general population. The problem with these
explanations is that tax evasion is a private decision, and the identification of tax evaders in the
population is difficult if not impossible unless the evader is caught. Consequently, the psychic
1 For those who are convicted of fraud, the rate goes up to 75%, while fines up to $100,000 and
imprisonment up to five years could be imposed for felony cases. However, such events are rare. In
1995 for example, only 4.1% of all evasion cases received a penalty for fraud or felony.
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cost is more likely to come from within the individual, rather than being imposed by outsiders.
For this reason, other economists have turned to fairness and ethical considerations as a way
to explain the low level of tax evasion. The basic idea of such an approach is that individual
taxpayers have in mind what their fair contribution is, and will happily not evade taxes as long
as what is asked from them does not exceed this fair contribution.
Following an approach similar to Laffont (1975), Bordignon (1993) develops a model in which
individuals display what he calls Kantian preferences. It involves a two-step process. First,
individuals determine what would be a fair amount of taxes to pay to finance public goods if
they were endowed with the average income in the economy. Then, one’s own fair contribution is
based both on the amount of public goods provided and on their relative position on the income
scale. Agents with above-average incomes believe they should contribute more, while agents with
below-average income believe they should contribute less. This is because individuals compare
their income to the average income level, rather than because they are using some explicit social
welfare function when constructing the ethical contribution. Then, in a second stage, they choose
how much to evade. If their tax liability is no more than what they believe is fair, they will
choose not to evade. Otherwise, they will evade, and the extent of their evasion will depend
upon the difference between their actual tax liability and their fair one.2 There is some evidence
to support Bordignon’s model. Spicer and Becker (1980) use an experimental approach to show
that individual who feel they are victims of fiscal inequality evade taxes more. The approach
we use in this paper will bear some formal similarity to Bordignon’s, but it differs in three key
respects. First, our analysis involves the decision to avoid taxes rather than to evade them.
Next, our analysis is explicitly concerned with using taxes for redistribution rather than for
public goods. Finally and most important, we suppose that households use a social welfare
function to calculate their fair tax burdens.
Tax avoidance is qualitatively different from tax evasion in an important dimension: it does
not involve illegal behaviour. Since there is no legal sanction against tax avoidance, it might
be thought that it is correspondingly more difficult to make the case that individuals will not
engage in it, especially since it apparently goes against their own self-interest.3 However, there
2 Bordignon builds on an earlier paper of his (Bordignon, 1990) in which he uses a similar procedure
to justify the absence of free-riding in public good contributions. More recently, Bilodeau and
Gravel (2000) generalized such an approach for a wide variety of games with public goods. In a
related approach, Sugden (1984) develops a model of ‘reciprocity’ in which households choose not
to free-ride in their voluntary public goods contributions as long as those in their community do,
but deviate otherwise.
3 In this context, it is interesting to note the argument of Musgrave (1992) that the deadweight loss
of redistributive taxation (tax avoidance) should not count (have ‘standing’) from the point of view
of normative tax analysis, unlike in standard optimal tax theory. That is, tax avoidance — like
free-riding — is somehow unethical so should not be rewarded.
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is some evidence that individuals do care about fairness in making certain economic decisions,
and apparently take actions that make themselves worse off, as in the case of choosing not to
avoid taxes.4 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) find that consumers who see a monopoly
price as unfair may refuse to buy a product even if buying the product would generate a surplus
for themselves. We also observe concerns about fairness and reciprocity in the determination of
prices, or wages. Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) survey a variety of situations where such phenomena
can be observed. For example, interpreting wage determination as a gift exchange, whereby firms
offer wages and workers respond with labour, can help explain why more profitable firms pay
higher wages. What is notable about these arguments is that taking fairness into account involves
making decisions that are contrary to one’s own selfish interests. This should be contrasted with
arguments for benevolent behaviour that rely on altruism. These effectively make it in one’s
self-interest to take others’ interests into account. As we shall see, in our context, ethical and
altruistic behaviour lead to quite different behavioural outcomes.5
The intent of this paper to introduce the notion of ethical behaviour to address another form
of social interaction: supplying labour to finance taxation for the purpose of redistribution. In
particular, we study the extent to which households may choose not to change their labour
supply (thereby not avoiding taxes) when faced with distortionary taxation if they have ethical
views over the amount of redistribution. As we have discussed, ethical preferences and behaviour
have been used as an argument for conditioning individual decisions about provision of public
good, either directly through voluntary provision, or indirectly through their decision to comply
with the tax system by choosing not to evade taxes. We shall deploy ethical behaviour to address
the issue of redistribution in an environment where taxes are distortionary so individuals can
avoid paying taxes (legally) by changing their labour supply. For simplicity, we concentrate on
a simple linear income tax in conjuction with a lump-sum transfer to all individuals, that is, a
linear progressive income tax.
As in the earlier literature, ethical behaviour enters into individuals’ decisions in a two-step
4 In the current paper, tax avoidance takes the form of a reduced labour supply. While legal sanctions
are not imposed on those providing a low level of labour supply, it is quite possible for society to
stigmatize those who work less, thereby making that choice less attractive. On such social norms and
sanctions, see Besley and Coate (1992) and Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999). An interesting
extension of those two papers, which is related to our analysis, is Cervellati, Esteban and Kranich
(2004) in which individuals, when voting over redistributive policies, use a social welfare function
and place more weight on individuals that are working more than some exogenous social norm (e.g.
average labour supply), and less on those who work less.
5 Another related method for inducing benevolent behaviour is to posit that households obtain utility
simply from the act of giving, independent of the consequences of that act. In the context of the
voluntary contribution to public goods, this is referred to as the ‘warm glow effect’. It leads to
yet different predictions, though we do not explore that possibility in this paper. However, it does
share with altruism the property that benevolent behaviour is turned into self-interested behaviour,
a property that presumably accounts for its acceptance by economists.
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process. In the first step, individuals determine what they regard as their fair, or ethical tax
liabilities (or the transfers they should receive depending on their income level). In the second
step, they compare the net tax liability that they would incur under the existing tax system if
they behaved in a non-distortionary manner with the amount they regard as fair according to
the first-stage ethical calculation. If this tax liability exceeds their ethical one, they deviate from
non-distortionary behaviour by supplying less labour to reduce their tax liability. The precise
amount by which they reduce their labour supply is discussed in detail in the following section.
The ethical tax liability is calculated by solving a social welfare maximizing problem for the
economy as a whole. Each individual chooses the marginal tax rate, the lump-sum transfer and
the labour supply for all individuals that maximizes a social welfare function with some aversion
to inequality. This yields an ethical tax system, a set of ethical labour supplies, and ethical tax
liabilities. As pointed out by Bordignon (1990) and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004), a procedure
such as this fits nicely with the Kantian principle (or Golden Rule): ‘Do unto others as you would
have them do unto you’. Bilodeau and Gravel (2004), in the context of voluntary contributions
to a public good, highlight two important conditions for an ethical rule to be consistent with
this Kantian principle. The first one is the principle of anonymity, which is satisfied by the
social welfare function that we choose.6 The second condition is that the rule must yield the
most preferred outcome to all individuals, when all individuals follow that rule. For example, in
a simple contribute or not, symmetric, public good game, all individuals contributing or none
contributing are two rules that satisfied anonymity, but only all individuals contributing satisfied
the second rule. In our context, matters are complicated because of the redistributive aspect
of our game. We assume that all individuals use the same social welfare function for ethical
purposes, and this guarantees satisfaction of the second condition.
An important aspect of such a process is that, if there were enough tax instruments, the outcomes
of all individuals’ ethical calculation would not only be identical, but they would also be first-
best. Then, the ethical labour supply of every individual would be the undistorted labour supply
that would apply if taxes had been lump-sum redistributive taxes. In our setting with a two-
parameter income tax system, this first-best ethical outcome will only occur if individuals are of
two wage types, and we shall take advantage of that simplification in what follows.
The idea that individuals maximize a social welfare function with some aversion to inequality
when assessing what is their desirable tax payment is far from being frivolous. Rabin (1998)
highlights the fact that experiments suggest that individuals even use a maximin social welfare
function in some circumstances. If they behave this way when it comes to experimental behaviour
regarding the sharing of some fixed pot, or with respect to illegal behaviour such as tax evasion,
it seems equally reasonable that they would do so with respect to perhaps the most significant
6 For a discussion of this axiom, see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005).
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form of behaviour that influences redistribution, their labour supply.
To emphasize the main features of our analysis, we adopt a form of household preferences—quasi-
linear in consumption and additive—such that there are no income effects on labour supply:
labour supply depends only on the net wage rate. One of the most striking differences we find
under ethical behaviour compared to behaviour originating from standard preferences is that
labour supplies are much less elastic with respect to changes in the tax rate in general, and in
some cases can be perfectly inelastic. For example, if the tax rate is relatively low, high-wage
agents end up paying less taxes than they believe is fair. Consequently, they choose their labour
supply as if the tax were lump-sum. In the absence of income effects, a change in the tax rate
will not change the situation, as long as the net tax they have to pay (the tax on their income less
the lump-sum transfer) is no greater that what they believe to be fair. The equivalent applies
for low-wage agents when tax rates are high.
The labour supply elasticity has been the subject of many studies. It is typically found that
the elasticity for men is close to zero, and that for married women, for whom the elasticity is
among the highest, is still relatively small.7 The traditional argument for such low elasticities
come from the fact that income and substitution effects cancel each other out. In our paper,
we shut down the income effect, so all the action in term of low elasticities comes from fairness
considerations. Overall, our model generates labour supplies that are higher and less responsive
to the after-tax wage rate than a model with purely selfish individuals would generate, especially
for extreme tax rates, either high or low. Such behaviour can have important consequences for
the individuals’ utility, which tends to be higher under ethical behaviour than under purely
self-interested preferences. The case in which the agents agree on the social welfare function
is instructive in that regard. In this case, all agents in the economy agree on what is fair to
pay (or receive): that is, they agree on what a fair tax rate (and lump-sum transfer) is. The
tax system is in fact able to generate transfers which are consistent with the fair contribution.
If the tax rate chosen is in fact that tax rate, all agents will be happy to provide undistorted
labour supply, leading to full efficiency. Moreover, if there are only two types of individuals —
the case that we focus on in this paper — the fair outcome will yield the first-best outcome,
that is, the one that a lump-sum tax-transfer system would yield. That is because with only two
types, a two-parameter linear progressive tax will have enough degrees of freedom to replicate a
lump-sum system. With more than two types, the first-best could not be achieved so inequality
would remain, but the amount of inequality would still be regarded as fair by all households,
given the restrictions implicit in a linear progressive income tax.
7 For a discussion of different studies on labour elasticity and taxation see Blundell (1992). Another
puzzle more closely related to taxes, as pointed out by Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), is the relatively
low concentration of income at tax kinks, suggesting that agents are not very responsive to taxes.
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Once we have described individual behavior, we can consider the effect of the tax rate on equi-
librium outcomes, and the tax rate that would be chosen under alternative institutional assump-
tions. A benchmark would be the optimal tax rate chosen by a benevolent government. As
mentioned, when households behave in the same ethical manner, this choice is trivial since all
households will agree on the fair tax rate. We study what happens to labour supply and welfare
when the tax rate deviates from the fair one, and compare this with the case of selfish behaviour.
It is then natural to consider voting over the tax schedule in such a context. When individuals
vote using as their preferences the ethical social welfare function benchmark (“fully ethical vot-
ing”), the voting problem is also trivial since all will vote for the fair tax rate. However, we argue
that even though individual individuals may behave ethically given the tax system, they might
reasonably vote at least partly according to self-interest. We analyze the consequences of this
for equilibrium outcomes assuming that the median voter is a low-wage individual. Contrary to
our first intuition, we find that the tax rate chosen by low-wage egoistic voters could actually
be lower when workers may potentially behave ethically than when they behave egoistically for
sure. Intuitively, because labour elasticities are lower under ethical behaviour, higher tax rates
might reasonably be chosen since they are less distortionary. However, low-wage individuals,
anticipating that they will behave ethically under high tax rates, may prefer a lower tax rate as
a way to protect themselves from such ethical behaviour. The relative size of the preferred tax
rates under potentially ethical and egoistic behaviour will obviously depend on the labour sup-
ply elasticity. This result is consistent with Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2004) who present
evidence showing that in the 2000 US Presidential election, the relative share of low-income
individuals among those voting for the Republican Party was surprisingly high.8
Finally, we compare our approach with a competing alternative where agents are simply altru-
istic, and regard providing higher labour supply as a way to increase the welfare of others. The
remarkable consequence of such an assumption is that agents will adjust their labour supply so
that they compensate for the imperfections of the tax system. For example, if taxes are too
low, high-wage agents will choose to work more than the efficient amount and low-wage agents
will choose to work less. This is reminiscent of the neutrality result in Bernheim and Bagwell
(1988), except that neutrality in our context is not a consequence of undoing the distortionary
tax system, but rather a consequence of undoing levels of redistribution that are judged to be
unfair. However, altruism is unable to generate an inelastic labour supply, which is counterfac-
tual. High-wage agents display a monotonically decreasing labour supply as the marginal tax
rate increases, while low-wage agents end up with a monotonically increasing labour supply, even
with no income effects. The reason is that when the tax rate increases, low-wage agents become
better off and want to redistribute part of the benefit to the richer agents. The only way to do
8 In their paper, they argue that such behaviour is due to the strategic bundling of extreme platforms
on religious issues by the two main parties.
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so is by working more.
2. The Model
Consider a world populated with n taxpayers deriving utility from consumption c and disutility
from working ` hours according to the quasi-linear additive utility function u(c, `) = c − h(`),
where h′ > 0 and h′′ > 0. We can think of these preferences as being ordinal for the purposes
of determining household behaviour. As we shall see below, the manner in which they are
cardinalized can be viewed as equivalent to defining the individual social utility functions in
an additive social welfare function. Taxpayers are indexed by i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and can differ
according to their wage rate wi. A taxpayer of type i working ` hours earns an income wi`
which is taxed through a linear income tax (to be endogenized later) with a proportional tax
rate t and a demogrant e. Consumption is therefore given by c = (1− t)wi`+ e and utility by
u = (1− t)wi`+ e− h(`).
Our analysis differs from previous work in the manner in which individuals choose their labour
supply in the face of taxation. In words, we assume that a taxpayer, when faced with tax
liabilities that correspond to what she views as reasonable or fair (which we define below),
behaves ethically — i.e., does not distort her behaviour to avoid taxes — and chooses to work
as if she were not taxed (as if t = 0). On the other hand, if she faces tax liabilities that she
views as unreasonable, she behaves egoistically (partially or fully), distorts her behaviour to
reduce her tax payment, and chooses her labour supply taking into account the linear income
tax schedule (with t > 0). Our assumption of quasi-linear additive preferences serves to make
this distinction precise because labour supply in this case depends only upon the after-tax wage
rate, or equivalently, the marginal tax rate given the household’s wage rate.
Specifically, let `i(t) be the fully egoistic labour supply of taxpayer i given tax schedule (t, e). It
is determined as follows:
`i(t) = argmax` (1− t)wi`+ e− h(`)
Thus, `i(t) solves the first-order condition (1− t)wi = h′(`i) from which it follows that `
′
i(t) =
−wi/h′′(`i) < 0. This implies that `i(t) depends on the wage rate wi: in particular, `i(t) > `j(t)
for wi > wj. Note that what we call the fully egoistic labour supply is nothing other than the
standard labour supply of mainstream microeconomics.9
9 It is assumed that the population size is large enough that it does no matter whether the household
sees through the government budget constraint. When a household realizes that the taxes paid are
redistributed back to all taxpayers in the form of the lump-sum transfer e, the first-order condition
becomes (1 − t)wi + twi/n = h′(`i). As the population size n becomes large, the effect on the
household’s labour supply of the lump-sum transfer becomes negligible. The ability of agents to
see through the government budget constraint will be important in our later discussion.
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Now let ¯`i be what we subsequently call the ethical labour supply of taxpayer i:
¯`i = argmax
`
wi`− h(`)
In other words, an ethical taxpayer completely abstracts from taxation — both the tax rate
t and the transfer e — in her choice of labour supply, and ¯`i solves the first-order condition
wi = h′(¯`i). Again note that ¯`i is increasing in the wage rate.
Taxpayer i’s ethical behaviour depends upon her perception of ethical outcomes for the economy
as a whole. Let t¯i be the tax rate that taxpayer i views as optimal or ethical, and let ¯`il be i’s
view of the ethical behaviour for taxpayers l = 1, · · · , n. These are computed by i as the solution
to a social welfare-maximizing problem10 in which i: i) uses a standard additive social welfare
function with constant aversion to inequality ρ, ii) puts an equal weight on all other individuals’
well-being as on her own, and iii) sees through the government budget constraint by recognizing
that the average tax liability equals the demogrant. Thus, taxpayer i’s ethical tax rate t¯i and
ethical labour supplies ¯`il, l = 1, ..., n, are given by the solution to following problem:
max
t,`i1,...,`in
[(1− t)wi`ii + e− h(`ii)]1−ρ
1− ρ
+
∑
j 6=i
[(1− t)wj`ij + e− h(`ij)]1−ρ
1− ρ
(1)
subject to the government budget constraint:
e = t
∑
k wk`ik
n
(2)
Note that the social welfare function used here could be interpreted as a utilitarian one in which
the term [(1 − t)wl`il + e − h(`il)]1−ρ/(1 − ρ) acts as the individual utility function. It is a
particular cardinalization of the household’s quasi-linear ordinal preferences.11 It is immediately
apparent that, if all taxpayers have the same ethical preference as we assume, the ethical tax
10 Our approach is to endogenize the perceived ethical tax rate and labour supplies by having each
individual maximize a social welfare function in which the weights put onto others are fixed and
exogenous. This is in contrast with Cervellati, Esteban, and Kranich (2004), who, in a different
context and with a different focus, assume that an individual’s preferences for redistribution are
established using a social welfare function with endogenous weights put onto others, but with an
exogenously set level of “acceptable” — we would say ethical — labour supplies.
11 In a more general treatment, we might consider the case where individuals are only partially ethical.
One way to do this would be to assume that their ethical tax rate and labour supplies solve the
following problem instead:
max
t,`i1,...,`in
[(1− t)wi`ii + e− h(`
i
i)]
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
i
∑
j 6=i
[(1− t)wj`ij + e− h(`
i
j)]
1−ρ
1− ρ (1
′)
where βi < 1. In order to make our arguments as simple as possible, we concentrate on the fully
ethical case, where βi = 1.
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rate t¯i and labour supplies `il are identical for all individuals i = 1, · · · , n since they all solve
the same problem.12 For this reason, we simply use the notation t¯ for the ethical tax rate, and
`el as the ethical labour supply for individual l ∈ {1, · · · , n} in what follows. Note that even if
individuals agree on `el , all individuals do not necessarily supply the same amount of labour: for
k 6= l, it might be that `ek 6= `el .
After substituting constraint (2) into the objective function (1), we obtain the following first-
order conditions on t¯ and `el :
(∑
k wk`ek
n
− wi`ei
)[
wi`ei − h(`ei ) + t¯
(∑
k wk`ek
n
− wi`ei
)]−ρ
(3)
+
∑
j 6=i
{(∑
k wk`ek
n
− wj`ej
)[
wj`ej − h(`ej) + t¯
(∑
k wk`ek
n
− wj`ej
)]−ρ}
= 0,
and
[
(1− t¯)wl + t¯
wl
n
− h′(`el )
] [
wl`el − h(`el ) + t¯
(∑
k wk`ek
n
− wi ¯`i
)]−ρ
(4)
+
∑
j 6=i
{
t¯wl
n
[
wj`ej − h(`ej) + t¯
(∑
k wk`ek
n
− wj`ej
)]−ρ}
= 0 l = 1, · · · , n
Equation (3) characterizes the tax rate perceived as ethical, while (4) characterizes the choice
of labour supplies for all taxpayers l = 1, · · · , n that are viewed as ethical. To further simplify
notation, we define income net of the disutility of labour as θi ≡ wi`ei − h(`ei ) (the utility in
consumption units that household i would get from earning the income associated with the
ethical labour supply `ei ) and average ethical income as y¯ ≡
∑
k wk`ek/n. Using these, we can
rewrite (3) and (4) as follows:
∑
j
{
[y¯ − wj`ej ][θj + t¯(y¯ − wj`ej)]−ρ
}
= 0, (5)
and
[(1−t¯)wl+t¯
wl
n
−h′(`el )][θl+t¯(y¯−wl`el )]−ρ+
∑
j 6=l
{
t¯wl
n
[θj+t¯(y¯−wj`ej)]−ρ
}
= 0 l = 1, · · · , n (6)
from which t¯ and all `el can be solved as a function of the relevant parameters.
Given the definition of t¯, we can define the ethical tax liability of i, denoted T¯i, as the amount
of tax she pays under t¯ when all individuals behave ethically: T¯i = t¯wi`ei − t¯y¯. Note that T¯i is
12 If individuals were to put a weight βi < 1 onto others, each would then possibly face a different
problem and `il would possibly differ for i = 1, ..., n.
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increasing in the wage rate wi. In our analysis below where the government’s policy is purely
redistributive, T¯i < 0 for the lowest-wage households. Note from (6) that if all individuals have
the same utility levels, then the ethical labour supply `ei = ¯`i, the undistorted labour supply.
Note also that in an economy with two wage levels, the ethical tax rate — the solution to (5)
— equalizes utilities among all households regardless of their wage rate.13 This result that
utilities are equalized in our model regardless of the value of ρ is a useful one that simplifies our
exposition and analysis considerably. Because the tax system has two instruments and there
are two type of agents, the appropriate tax rate and demogrant can replicate the lump-sum tax
system. Consequently, it is the evident that the undistorted labour supply maximizes social
welfare.
On the other hand, in an economy with more than two wage levels, the ethical tax rate does not
generally equalize utilities among all households. With a linear progressive income tax, there
are not enough instruments to replicate a lump-sum tax system, and utility will increase with
the wage rate in the second-best ethical optimum. In this case, labour supply can be used to
compensate for the lack of instruments in the tax system. For example, the ethical labour supply
for the lowest-wage taxpayer, say, i = 1, is characterized by `e1 = (1 − t¯)w1 + t¯w1/n− h′(`e1) +
t¯w1(n− 1)/n > 0, which is less than the undistorted labour supply. In contrast, the highest-
wage taxpayer is expected to provide more than the undistorted labour supply. This trade-off
might seem surprising at first sight since utility functions are separable between consumption
and leisure, but recall that applying the social welfare function undoes such separability. Finally,
since reducing the labour supply below the undistorted one is used solely to increase the utility
of lower-wage taxpayers, all taxpayers are still expected to provide a labour supply which is
equal or higher to the egotistical case, since reducing it further would only reduce utility.
We can now state explicitly our behavioural assumptions on the choice of labour supply of
taxpayer i when she faces tax schedule (t, e). We assume that she behaves ethically under
(t, e) and supplies `ei if her net tax liability when she supplies `ei does not exceed T¯i, that is,
if twi`ei − e ≤ T¯i. If her net tax liability when she supplies `ei is larger than T¯i, that is, if
twi`ei − e > T¯i, she adopts one of two possible behaviours: partial or full egoism depending on
which one leads to higher labour supply. Under partial egoism, she adjusts her labour supply
to the level that ensures that she pays exactly her ethical net tax liability T¯i. In that case, she
supplies `?i (t, e) such that twi`?i − e = T¯i. Clearly, it must be that `?i (t, e) < `ei , and as t diverges
from t¯, `?i (t, e) also diverges from `ei . The taxpayer turns to full egoism when it is not possible
13 This should be contrasted with the famous Mirrlees (1974) result that under utilitarianism (of
which the above can be interpreted, as we have mentioned), high-wage households will be worse off
than low-wage ones under first-best lump-sum transfers. This difference can be accounted for by
the fact that with quasi-linear preferences, leisure is not a normal good, which is required for the
Mirrlees result.
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for her to select `?i (t, e) such that she pays exactly T¯i while satisfying `?i (t, e) > `i(t). In this
case, taxpayer i simply chooses `i(t). The behaviour of taxpayer i is summarized as follows:14
`i =



`ei if twi`ei − e ≤ T¯i
`?i (t, e) = (T¯i + e)/twi if twi`ei − e > T¯i and `?i (t, e) > `i(t)
`i(t) if twi`ei − e > T¯i and `?i (t, e) ≤ `i(t)
(7)
Note that the net tax liability of taxpayer i is exactly T¯i when she supplies `ei or `?i (t, e), and
that it differs from T¯i when she supplies her fully egoistic labour supply `i(t). This analysis
applies whether T¯i >< 0. That is, for a transfer recipient for whom T¯i < 0, ethical labour supply
¯`i will be supplied whenever twi ¯`i − e ≤ T¯i, so that the transfer is larger in absolute terms than
that regarded as ethical. For the transfer recipient, reductions in t will ultimately result a move
from `ei to `?i (t, e) and then to `i, whereas for a taxpayer the opposite is the case.
3. The case with only two types of individuals
We consider a simplified world in which there are only two types of taxpayers. Most of the
qualitatively interesting results apply in this case. In this case, the first best is attainable in the
ethical optimum, so the ethical labour supply is simply the undistorted one. With more that
two type of agents, because the tax system is not flexible enough only a second best would be
possible and this complicates the analysis slightly. However, the dynamics of how this second
best is attainable are the same as in the two-type case. We assume n1 taxpayers with wage rate
w1, and n2 with wage rate w2, where w2 > w1. Total population is still n = n1 + n2.
As mentioned, all taxpayers have the same optimal-ethical tax rate t¯ = t¯1 = t¯2 > 0, since all
have the same objective function in (1). And, since utilities are equalized for the two types, we
know by (6) that `ei = ¯`i. Given these, we immediately obtain from (5):
t¯ = θ2 − θ1
w2 ¯`2 − w1 ¯`1
= 1− h(
¯`2)− h(¯`1)
w2 ¯`2 − w1 ¯`1
(8)
where recall that θi ≡ wi ¯`i−h(¯`i) is income net of the disutility of labour under ethical behaviour.
Since t¯ > 0, this implies that θ2 > θ1. Thus, while all taxpayers have the same utility under t¯,
their incomes net of the disutility of labour differ: high-wage individuals earn more since they
are more productive.
14 An alternative, and perhaps stronger, form of ethical behaviour would have the taxpayer increase
her labour supply above the ethical level `ei if her tax liability is less than T¯i. The approach we
adopt where individuals only deviate from ethical behaviour when their tax liabilities are too high
mirrors the ethical assumption adopted by Bordignon (1993) and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) in a
voluntary contribution to public good setting. We return to the motivation for our choice of ethical
assumptions in the concluding section.
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Let t˜i be the tax rate at which a taxpayer i chooses to become fully egoistic given that taxpayer
j behaves ethically, that is, such that `i(t˜i) = `?i (t˜i, e) given j supplies ¯`j. Then, taxpayer i’s
choice of labour supply depends on the level of the prevailing tax rate t relative to the optimal-
ethical tax rate t¯ and to t˜i, as well as on whether her net tax liability is positive (net contributor)
or negative (net recipient). In our analysis with only two types, a taxpayer with a high wage
w2 is a net contributor to the government budget while a taxpayer with a low wage w1 is a net
recipient of government resources as long as t > 0. Given that, the following lemma is apparent:
Lemma 1: The key tax rates are ordered as follows: t˜1 < t¯ < t˜2.
In the context of the current model, we define a Behavioural equilibrium as follows.
Definition: For a given t, a Behavioural equilibrium is a pair of labour supplies (`1, `2) which
simultaneously satisfy (7).
Thus, a Behavioural equilibrium is the analog of a Nash equilibrium except for the fact that the
players, instead of maximizing an objective function, follow the behavioural rule given in (7).
Using Lemma 1, we can readily characterize the Behavioural equilibrium choices of labour supply
by the two types of taxpayer for various levels of the tax rate t. Note that in characterizing
equilibrium behaviour, we take account of the fact that the government budget constraint is
satisfied so that the demogrant e equals average tax revenue. Then, in what follows, we abuse
notation innocuously by suppressing e from the `?i (·) function and simply writing `?i (t) for the
partially egoistic labour supply given the prevailing tax rate t and the associated transfer.
Proposition 1: Given Lemma 1, there exists a Behavioural equilibrium associated with each
tax rate t in which labour supplies (`1, `2) are as follows:
{`1(t), ¯`2} for t ≤ t˜1;
{`?1(t), ¯`2} for t˜1 < t < t¯, where `?1(t) = [t¯/t]¯`1 − [(t¯− t)/t][w2 ¯`2/w1];
{¯`1, ¯`2} for t = t¯; (9)
{¯`1, `?2(t)} for t¯ < t < t˜2, where `?2(t) = [t¯/t]¯`2 − [(t¯− t)/t][w1 ¯`1/w2];
{¯`1, `2(t)} for t˜2 ≤ t.
12
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In words, because a taxpayer with a high wage w2 is a net contributor, she behaves ethically for
all tax rates t below t¯. As the tax rate t increases above t¯, she becomes egoistic, at first partially
so as to maintain constant her net tax liability, and then fully for t ≥ t˜2 to prevent it from
growing too fast as in the standard model.15 Conversely, a taxpayer with a low wage w1 is a
net recipient of government resources. She behaves ethically as long as she receives enough from
the government, that is, as long as the prevailing tax rate is above t¯ and can finance what she
views as a reasonable net transfer. When the tax rate t decreases below t¯, she initially becomes
partially egoistic, ensuring that she still obtains a constant net transfer from the government
(a constant negative net tax liability). Then, for all tax rates t below t˜1, she behaves fully
egoistically. We depict the equilibrium pairs of labour supply in Figure 1a and 1b, and the
corresponding equilibrium net tax liabilities in Figure 1c.
In Figures 1a and 1b, the solid lines represent the labour supplies for the two types of households
under ethical behaviour, while the dashed lines represent the standard egoistic labour supplies.
Because there are no income effects, the egoistic labour supplies are always decreasing. The
striking difference between the two cases is that under ethical behaviour, labour supplies display
some stickiness. Moreover, labour supplies for the low-wage (transfer-receiving) household are
not even weakly monotonic in the tax rate: for a range of tax rates, they are actually increasing.16
In Figure 1c, we have depicted net tax liabilities for the case where there are an equal number of
taxpayers of each type.17 In that case, the net tax liability of a taxpayer of type 2 is the inverted
image of that of a taxpayer of type 1. Note that whatever the number of taxpayers, the curves
always exhibit a flat portion between t˜1 and t˜2. Also note that T2 (T1) is necessarily increasing
(decreasing) at the left of t˜1 and at the right of t˜2.
This Behavioural equilibrium generates private indirect utility functions (which can be found in
the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix). These private indirect utility function will be used
later when we investigate voting behaviour. For now, we can use them to compare utility levels
achieved under our assumed ethical behaviour and under egoistic preferences. Figures 2a and
15 Note that despite individuals of type 2 becoming fully egoistic, we have that at t = t˜2, their tax
liability increases. Eventually, for some t > t˜2, the top of the Laffer curve will be reached and their
tax liability will decline.
16 Note that it is possible to ascertain the impact of a change in wages — or any other exogenous
parameter — on the shape of the labour supplies in Figures 1a and 1b. Consider, for example, an
increase in w2. Such a change leads to an increase in t¯ and t˜1 but it has an ambiguous impact on
t˜2. Thus, in Figure 1a, the first downward solid segment goes further down. From there, the solid
line goes up and reaches the flat segment corresponding to unchanged ¯`1 at a higher level of tax
t¯, and it remains flat for larger tax rates. In Figure 1b, ¯`2 increases so the first flat solid segment
shifts up and remains flat for a longer distance as t¯ also increases. From t¯, all we can say is that
the solid line goes down, and that it may or may not cross with the initial solid line.
17 The number of taxpayers affects the relative height of the curves, but not their shape.
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2b represent the equilibrium levels of utility under ethical behaviour (the solid line) and egoistic
preferences (the dashed line).
To understand these figures better, we need to know how utility changes when the tax rate
changes under both regimes. Begin with the benchmark of egoistic utilities, which is the simplest
case. Denote the level of utility achieved by individual i when all individuals in the economy act
egoistically as follows:
vSi (t) = (1− t)wi`i(t) +
t[n1w1`1(t) + n2w2`2(t)]
n
− h(`i(t))
Applying the envelope theorem to vSi (t), we obtain:
∂vSi (t)
∂t
= −wi`i(t) +
n1w1`1(t) + n2w2`2(t)
n
+
t
n
[
n1w1
∂`1(t)
∂t
+ n2w2
∂`2(t)
∂t
]
.
The last two terms represent the impact of a change in the tax rate on total tax revenue, which
we assume is positive. That is, we restrict ourselves to the left-hand side of the Laffer curve. It
is then easy to show that an increase in t leads to an unambiguous decrease in welfare for type
2’s:
∂vS2 (t)
∂t
= −
n1
n
[w2`2(t)− w1`1(t)] +
t
n
[
n1w1
∂`1(t)
∂t
+ n2w2
∂`2(t)
∂t
]
< 0.
On the other hand, welfare of type 1’s will be increasing in t if and only if
n2
n
[w2`2(t)− w1`1(t)] > −
t
n
[
n1w1
∂`1(t)
∂t
+ n2w2
∂`2(t)
∂t
]
. (10)
For such condition to be satisfied, it must the case that n2 is sufficiently large and also that
w2 − w1 be sufficiently large compared to t. In the extreme case of an economy with only type
1’s, an increase in tax will only be distortionary. Similarly, if w1 is close to w2, type-1 individuals
do not benefit much from redistribution. Of course, if the welfare of type-1’s is also decreasing
in t, there is no conflict and both types prefer a lower t. Consequently, we restrict ourselves to
cases where the tax rate is small enough so that ∂vS1 (t)/∂t > 0 and (10) applies.
Consider now the impact of taxes on the welfare of each type of individual in an economy with
ethical behaviour. Obviously, when t = 0, ethical behaviour or egoistic preferences yield the same
results, and we can take that as our starting point. Begin with the type-2’s. When 0 < t < t˜1,
the welfare of type 2’s is decreasing with the tax rate, because their labour supply is unchanged,
while type 1’s reduce their labour supply. In this range, type 2’s get lower utility compared to
the case of egoistic preferences. In the range of tax rates such that t˜1 < t < t¯, type-2’s choose
¯`2, while labour supply for type-1’s increases as t goes up, so they always receive a net total
transfer of T¯1. With two wage-types, this implies that a type-2 individual pays the same net
total taxes in this range, as shown in Figure 1c. Given that labour supply stays constant, her
15
welfare does not change as t goes up. At t¯, all individuals are better off under ethical behaviour,
so there exist a point between t˜1 and t¯ where the welfare of type-2’s is identical under ethical
behaviour and egoistic preferences. Then, for all tax rates between t¯ and t˜2, type-2’s pay the
same net total taxes, so the variation in welfare is given by
∂v2(t)
∂t
= [w2 − h′(`?2(t))]
∂`?2(t)
∂t
< 0.
Finally, v2(t) is decreasing in t > t˜2 since type 2’s pay more tax and work less. Note that for
all tax rates above t¯, type-2’s are better off under ethical behaviour, since type-1’s provide more
effort than their egoistic level. Figure 2b depicts clearly all these effects.
Figure 2a illustrates the equilibrium levels of utility for type-1’s as t changes. As mentioned
earlier, under egoistic preferences, the utility of these individuals is monotonically increasing
with the tax rate (until maximal tax revenues are reached). Things are different under ethical
behaviour. For tax rates less than t˜1, the impact of a change in tax rate on utility is given by
∂v1(t)
∂t
=
n2
n
[w2`2(t)− w1`1(t)] +
t
n
[
n1w1
∂`1(t)
∂t
]
.
Thus, given our assumption above that vS1 (t) is increasing in t, so is v1(t) by (10). Of more
interest, utility is also increasing in the range of taxes between t˜1 and t¯. In this range, type-2’s
increase their labour supply so that their tax payment, and therefore the transfer received by
type-1’s net of tax is constant. This implies that the change in welfare for type-1’s is given by:
∂v1(t)
∂t
= [w1 − h′(`?1(t))]
∂`?1(t)
∂t
> 0.
Intuitively, a type-1 individual receives the same transfer, but works more (and gets paid more)
as taxes increases over that range. Since labour supply is less than ¯`1, type-1’s end up better
off by working more. Note that for every tax rate t ≤ t¯, type-1’s obtain a higher level of utility
under ethical preference because type-2’s provide the efficient labour supply ¯`2. Then, when the
tax rate is higher than t¯, but less than t˜2, the utility level of type-1’s is constant. They receive
the same net transfer, because the type 2’s pay the same net taxes, and they provide the same
labour supply ¯`1. Finally, for tax rates above t˜2,
∂v1(t)
∂t
=
n2
n
[w2`2(t)− w1 ¯`1] +
t
n
[
n2w2
∂`2(t)
∂t
]
,
which may be increasing (Case A) or decreasing (Case B) in t at t˜2. The reason is as follows.
First, notice that the derivative of v1(t) with respect to tax rate contains the term [w2`2(t)−w1 ¯`1],
while the same derivative for the egoistic preferences contains the term [w2`2(t)−w1`1(t)] instead.
Consequently, it is possible for the derivative of v1(t) with respect to tax rate to be negative while
its counterpart for the egoistic preferences is positive. Intuitively, under ethical behaviour, type
16
1’s provide higher labour supply for higher tax rates, so the loss of income due to an increase
in tax rate is higher. Since at t˜2, the utility of a type-1 individual is higher under egoistic
preference,18 there exists a point between t¯ and t˜2 where both types of preference yield the same
level of utility.
t
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Figure 2a, Case A
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18 This is because behaving egoistically is a best response to the egoistic behaviour of others. Thus,
supplying `1 is by definition the best response to `2, and it must yield a higher level of utility.
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An interesting feature of the ethical preference environment is that a tax rate of t¯ Pareto domi-
nates any other tax rate between t˜1 and t˜2.
4. Voting
In this section, we investigate and compare the voting outcome when households vote ethically
or egoistically. Thus, a critical assumption is what preferences are used when voting. Generally,
anticipating the Behavioural equilibrium in labour supplies and the associated private utilities,
it is possible to identify the most-preferred tax rate of a voter of wage-type 1 as the solution to
the following problem:
max
t
v1(t) + β[(n1 − 1)v1(t) + n2v2(t)]
where β is the ethical weight put onto others in society. The corresponding problem for a voter
of wage-type 2 is:
max
t
v2(t) + β[n1v1(t) + (n2 − 1)v2(t)]
We use the term ‘ethical voting’ to describe the situation in which households vote in accordance
with the ethical social welfare benchmark given in equation (1), i.e. with β = 1. In such a case,
the voting outcome would be trivial: the most-preferred outcome for all households would be t¯.
This would correspond with the optimal tax system under ethical behaviour as well.
However, individuals might put a weight β < 1 onto others when voting. As we have seen in
Figure 2, household private utilities are not necessarily maximized for either household at the
ethical tax rate t¯. Low-wage households might be better off for tax rates t ≥ t˜2, while high-wage
households would be better off for t ≤ t˜1. Consequently, the tax policy which maximizes one’s
utility will often conflict with the ethical tax policy.
Because avoidance activities are at least partially observable, social stigma and/or associated
repercussions may be the underlying force of conformity with ethical behaviour. However, the
secret ballot, which is widely used in democratic societies, makes it difficult for voting behaviour
to be influenced by such considerations. For this reason, we consider the case in which households
vote at least in part according to their self-interest, even though once the tax rate is set, they
may behave ethically. Of course, their voting behaviour will take into account the fact that
the equilibrium tax rate may deviate from the ethically preferred one and may result in them
behaving partially or fully egoistically.
We first consider the extreme case in which β = 0, which we label “fully egoistic voting”, and
then turn to the case where voting is “partially ethical” (0 < β < 1). When β = 0, and
since low-wage households will tend to prefer higher tax rates than high-wage households, there
18
will be a conflict between them that will be resolved by whichever type is in the majority.
As we shall see, private preferences of both types will be single-peaked in the tax rate under
reasonable assumptions, so the median voter’s most-preferred outcome will constitute a voting
equilibrium. In fact, we need not even rely on single-peaked preferences to obtain a median-
voter equilibrium. As Gans and Smart (1996) show, there will be a Condorcet winner in voting
over linear progressive tax schedules as long as household preferences satisfy a single-crossing
property in consumption-income space, which holds in our problem. We assume in what follows
that n1 > n2, so that the median voter is low-wage. This implies that we need only investigate
the voting preferences of type-1 households. The case with n2 > n1 is far less interesting since
the utility of the individuals of type 2 is decreasing with the tax rate, implying that their most
preferred tax rate is simply zero.
Thus, under egoistic voting, type-1 voters prefer a tax rate that weakly exceeds the ethical tax
rate t¯. However, their preferred tax rate may either exceed or fall below t˜2. To distinguish these
cases, we denote type-1’s preferred tax rate as tA1 when it exceeds t˜2: thus, tA1 ∈ [t˜2, 1[. Similarly,
tB1 denotes type 1’s preferred tax rate when it is less that t˜2, so tB1 ∈ [t¯, t˜2]. Consider the optimal
tax rates for each of these cases in turn.
For tax rates above t˜2, individuals of type 2 are behaving egoistically, while those of type 1 supply
the ethical amount of labour. Utility for a type 1 for any tax rate above t˜2 can be written:
v1(t) = (1− t)w1 ¯`1 + e(t)− h(¯`1) = (1− t)w1 ¯`1 + t
[
α1w1 ¯`1 + α2w2`2(t)
]
− h(¯`1),
where αi = ni/n is the share of type i’s in the economy. The first and second derivatives of v1(t)
are:
v′1(t) = −w1 ¯`1 +
[
α1w1 ¯`1 + α2w2`2(t)
]
+ tα2w2
∂`2(t)
∂t
, v′′1 (t) = 2α2w2
∂`2(t)
∂t
+ t
∂2`2(t)
∂t2
.
Since ∂`2(t)/∂t < 0, v′′1 (t) < 0 if ∂2`2(t)/∂t2 < 0, which is not guaranteed. Nonetheless, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that v′′1 (t) < 0, in which case preferences are single-peaked. However,
as mentioned above, this condition is not necessary to ensure that a Condorcet winner exists. If
type 1’s preferred tax rate is above t˜2, it will satisfy the first-order condition v′(tA1 ) = 0, or:
−(1− α1)w1 ¯`1 + α2w2`2(tA1 ) + tA1 α2w2
∂`2(tA1 )
∂tA1
= 0. (11)
Consider now tax rates below t˜2, i.e. t ∈ [t¯, t˜2]. Let Ti(t) = twi`i(t)−(t/n)[n1w1`1(t)+n2w2`2(t)]
be the net tax liability of an individual of type i. Using this notation, the government budget
constraint can be written as n1T1(t) + n2T2(t) = 0. Now, from Figure 1c we know that for
t ∈ [t¯, t˜2], all individuals of type 2 supply `?2(t) so that their net tax liability remains constant:
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∂T2(t)/∂t = 0. This and the government budget constraint implies that the net tax liability of
the type 1 individuals also remains constant: ∂T1(t)/∂t = 0. Consider now the problem of an
individual of type 1 having to chose a tax rate t ∈ [t¯, t˜2]:
max
t
w1 ¯`1 − T1(t)− h(¯`1).
Clearly, the objective function of this problem is flat and there is no preferred tax rate by
individuals of type 1 in that range.
Whether type 1’s preferred tax rate lies above or below t˜2 depends on the parameters of the
problem. In Figure 2a, Case A, since v1(t) is increasing in t at t˜2, individuals of type 1 are better
off at a tax rate tA1 above t˜2 characterized by (11). On the contrary, in Figure 2a, Case B, v1(t)
is decreasing in t at t˜2 so that any tax rate tB1 ∈ [t¯, t˜2] dominates tax rates that larger than t˜2.
Algebraically, v1(tA1 ) > v1(tB1 ) if:
(1− tA1 )w1 ¯`1 + tA1 [α1w1 ¯`1 + α2w2`2(tA1 )] > (1− tB1 )w1 ¯`1 + tB1 [α1w1 ¯`1 + α2w2`?2(tB1 )],
or
w2
[
tA1 `2(tA1 )− tB1 `?2(tB1 )
]
> (tA1 − tB1 )w1 ¯`1.
The left-hand side is the extra revenue collected from the individuals of type 2 from imposing
the higher tax tA1 rather than tB1 . The right-hand side is the loss in welfare to the individuals of
type 1 from their higher tax liabilities. Thus, if individuals of type 1 can extract high enough
additional revenue to compensate for their own higher tax liabilities, they will prefer to do so,
as is the case in Figure 2a, Case A.
Next, let us compare the preferred tax rate of a type 1 voting egoistically when behaviour
can potentially be ethical (as given by equation (7)) with that under pure egoistic behaviour.
The former, characterized above, is tA1 or tB1 , while the latter, denoted tE1 , is the tax rate that
maximizes v1(t) = (1 − t)w1`1(t) + e(t)− h(`1(t)), where e(t) = t[α1w1`1(t) + α2w2`2(t)]. The
preferred tax rate tE1 satisfies the first order-condition:
−w1`1(tE1 ) + α1w1`1 + α2w2`2 + tE1
[
α1w1
∂`1
∂t
+ α2w2
∂`2
∂t
]
= 0,
or
n2
[
w2`2(tE1 )− w1`1(tE1 )
]
+ tE1
[
n1w1
∂`1
∂t
+ n2w2
∂`2
∂t
]
= 0.
When behaviour can potentially be ethical, assuming tA1 applies, the first-order condition can be
written:
n2
[
w2`2(tA1 )− w1 ¯`1
]
+ tA1 n2w2
∂`2
∂t
= 0.
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To determine whether tA1 >< tE1 , we can evaluate the first-order condition for tA1 at tE1 :
n2
[
w2`2(tE1 )− w1 ¯`1
]
+ tE1 n2w2
∂`2(tE1 )
∂t
>< 0.
The first-order condition for tE1 can be used to replace the last term in this expression:
n2
[
w2`2(tE1 )− w1 ¯`1
]
+ n2
[
w1`1(tE1 )− w2`2(tE1 )
]
− tE1 n2w2
∂`1(tE1 )
∂t
>< 0,
or
`(tE1 )− tE1
∂`1(tE1 )
∂t
>< ¯`1.
Equivalently, this can be written:
1 +
tE1
1− tE1
ε ><
¯`1
`1
,
where ε is the elasticity of the egoistic labour supply. Thus if 1 + [tE1 /(1− t)E1 ]ε > ¯`1/`1, then
tA1 > tE1 . In words, if the elasticity of labour supply is high enough, the tax rate chosen under
egoistic voting when behaviour is potentially ethical will be higher than that when it is purely
egoistic. The intuition is that a higher labour supply elasticity magnifies the deadweight loss
associated with pure egoistic behaviour.
As an example, consider the case in which individuals all have the same utility function u(c, `) =
c− e`, and let n1 = n2. It can then be shown that t¯, which is also tB1 ,19 is given by:
t¯ = 1−
w2 − w1
w2 ln(w2)− w1 ln(w1)
We have seen that tA1 is the solution to equation (11), which, in the context of the current
example, is written as:
[w2 ln(w2)− w1 ln(w1)] + w2
[
ln(1− tA1 )−
tA1
1− tA1
]
= 0
As for tE1 , it is the solution to:
[w2 ln(w2)− w1 ln(w1)] + [w2 − w1] ln(1− tE1 )− [w1 + w2]
tE1
1− tE1
= 0
It is difficult to compare tB1 with tA1 and tE1 because tA1 and tE1 are the solution to an implicit
equation. However, for given values of the wages, it is possible to solve numerically for tA1 and
tE1 . Hence, if w1 = 50 and w2 = 200, we obtain tA1 = 0.75, tB1 = t¯ = 0.44, and tE1 = 0.72. Thus,
we have that tA1 > tE1 > tB1 . Consequently, the tax rate chosen when behaviour may be ethical
19 Since voters of type 1 are indifferent between any tax rate in [¯t, t˜2], we simply assume that they
select tB1 = t¯.
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is larger than the one chosen when individuals are purely egoistic. This corresponds to Case A
in Figure 2a.
To summarize, for the case where the voters of wage-type 1 are the majority, we have seen that
for egoistic voting (β = 0), the voting equilibrium is established at tA1 > t¯ in Case A, or tB1 = t¯ in
Case B. As for the case of fully ethical voting (β = 1), we have seen that the voting equilibrium
tax rate is t¯. It is then possible to show that for the case of partially ethical voting (0 < β < 1),
the voting equilibrium tax rate must be some t ∈ [t¯, tA1 ]. When the voters of wage-type 2 are the
majority, the equilibrium tax rate under egoistic voting is 0 while that under fully ethical voting
is t¯. In the case of partially ethical voting (0 < β < 1), the voting equilibrium tax rate must
then be some t ∈ [0, t¯]. It follows from this analysis that when voting becomes more egoistic (i.e.
when β decreases), voting becomes more polarized and the result of the voting equilibrium is
more extreme, i.e. the equilibrium tax rate t is closer to 0 or tA1 . On the other hand, when voting
becomes more ethical (i.e. when β increases), voting becomes less polarized and the result of
the voting equilibrium is more consensual, the equilibrium tax rate t converging to t¯.
5. Altruism
Under ethical behaviour, households are effectively acting against their own personal interests
when they choose to supply labour ethically. In contrast to that, preferences might be modeled
so that behaving socially is in one’s own interest. There are different ways of doing this. One
way, common in the literature on voluntary contributions to public goods, is to suppose there is
a ‘warm glow’ associated with giving, that is, that there is utility of giving per se, as in Andreoni
(1995a). The analogue in the context of intergenerational transfers is that households obtain a
utility from their bequests, as in, say, Atkinson (1971).
Alternatively, households might be motivated by altruism, that is, by the benefits accruing to
others in society as a result of their social contributions. This is a common approach in the
literatures on redistribution and bequests, the former going back to Hochman and Rodgers
(1969) and the latter to Barro (1974). In this section we consider the case where altruism
influences labour supply. This provides a useful contrast with ethical behaviour because whereas
those behaving ethically must make a sacrifice in their own utility to behave in a way that helps
others, under altruism that is not the case: giving is in their own self-interest. The two cases
turn out to lead to different predictions about behaviour.
As before, we denote by t the marginal tax rate, and by e the lump-sum transfer. Each individual
i’s personal welfare measured in terms of consumption is again given by (1− t)wi`i + e− h(`i).
However, self-interested individuals no longer maximize this personal utility, but maximize utility
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including an altruistic component. In particular, the labour supply of a type-i household satisfies:
max
`i
[(1− t)wi`i + e− h(`i)]1−ρ
1− ρ
+ βi
∑
j 6=i
[(1− t)wj`j + e− h(`j)]1−ρ
1− ρ
, (12)
where βi is the degree of altruism of the household i. It will turn out to be important whether
or not households see through the government budget constraint when making their choices.
Obviously, if they do not see through the government budget constraint, which is given by
t
∑
i wi`i = ne, they will choose the egoistic labour supply `i, characterized by the solution to
wi(1− t) = h′(`i). There is nothing surprising here: even if households care about the well-being
of others, they do not realize that changing their labour supply affects that well-being, so they
act as purely egoistic households.
Suppose, however, that altruistic households do see through the government budget constraint.
This makes for a more meaningful comparison with the ethical preference outcomes, although
it is important to recognize that such an assumption is more substantive than is needed for
the ethical preference scenario. Each household solves problem (12) subject to the government
budget constraint. The first-order condition for agent i is given by:
wi(1− t)− h′(`i) = −
t
n
wi
{
1 + βi
∑
j 6=i
[
(1− t)wi`i + e− h(`i)
(1− t)wj`j + e− h(`j)
]ρ}
.
If this type-i household does not care about other households (βi = 0), the labour supply decision
would be done accordingly to the first order condition wi(1− t)−h′(`i) = −twi/n, which implies
that `i > `i. Households equalize the marginal cost of effort to their after-tax wage, but also
take in consideration the fact that part of the tax they pay will be returned to them as a
lump-sum transfer. When the population size becomes large, `i = `i, because a household’s tax
contribution does not perceptibly affect the transfer she receives.
Let us focus on the case in which βi = 1, a case which resembles that with ethical behaviour
studied above. Notice that if the tax system were such that all households obtained the same
utility, the first-order condition would become:
wi(1− t)− h′(`i) = −
twi[1 + (n− 1)]
n
which implies that wi = h′(`i), and that `i = ¯`i. Therefore, as long as we end up with full
equalization of utilities, households will choose to behave as if the tax were lump-sum. When
there are two wage types (i = 1, 2), this actually corresponds to the case where t = t¯ under
an ethical utility function. With more that two types of agents, it is not generally possible to
equalize all utilities levels with a linear progressive tax system. As in the ethical behaviour case,
we concentrate here on the case where there are only two types of households.
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Recall that n1 is the number of agents with wage w1, and n2 is the number of agents with wage
w2, where w2 > w1. Since all households of a given type will have the same utility, the first-order
conditions for each of the two types in equilibrium are given by:
w1(1− t)− h′(`1) = −
t
n
w1
{
1 + n2 + (n1 − 1)
[
(1− t)w1`1 + e− h(`1)
(1− t)w2`2 + e− h(`2)
]ρ}
,
w2(1− t)− h′(`2) = −
t
n
w2
{
1 + n1 + (n2 − 1)
[
(1− t)w2`2 + e− h(`2)
(1− t)w1`1 + e− h(`1)
]ρ}
Recall also that if both agents choose ¯`i, and the tax is set such that t = t¯, then both utility
levels are equalized. From the first-order condition, we can see that if the tax rate is set at t¯,
both agents will in fact choose ¯`i. At t¯ both pure altruism and our assumed ethical behaviour
yield the same result that both households act as if the tax were lump-sum: neither exploits the
tax distortion for their own egoistic advantage.
Suppose now that the tax rate differs from t¯. To simplify the notation, let ψ be defined as
follows:
ψ =
[
(1− t)w1`1 + e− h(`1)
(1− t)w2`2 + e− h(`2)
]ρ
Using this, the first-order conditions in equilibrium become:
w1(1− t)− h′(`1) = −
t
n
w1[1 + (n1 − 1) + (n2)ψ],
w2(1− t)− h′(`2) = −
t
n
w2
[
1 + (n2 − 1) + (n1)
1
ψ
]
.
When the tax rate is lower than t¯, the type-1 households have a lower level of utility than
type-2’s, so ψ < 1. For such a tax rate,
w1(1− t)− h′(`1) = −
tw1[n1 + n2ψ]
n
> −
tw1[n1 + n2]
n
so type 1 households labour supply is less than ¯`1. On the other hand, the first-order condition
for individuals of type 2 reveals that:
w2(1− t)− h′(`2) = −
t
n
w2
[
1 + (n2 − 1) + (n1)
1
ψ
]
< −
t
n
w2[n1 + n2]
so individuals of type 2 supply more than ¯`2. With altruistic preference, there are no limits to
how much households will compensate for the imperfection in the tax system. The same analysis
can be undertaken for tax rates above t¯. Figure 3a and 3b show the labour supplies for the two
types under altruistic and egoistic preferences.
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The contrast with respect to both egoistic and ethical labour supplies are striking, especially for
the low-wage households. For low-wage altruistic households, labour supplies are monotonically
increasing in the tax rate, the mirror image of the egoistic case. For the high-wage types,
the labour supply is decreasing in t, but is everywhere higher under altruistic preferences than
under egoistic ones. Labour supplies in the ethical case are intermediate to the other two, and
are characterized by inelastic ranges that are unique to the ethical case.
In the case of ethical behaviour, taxpayers chose their labour supply such that it conflicted with
their own preferences. Consequently, it made sense to assume that voters in such an environment
could vote according to their egoistic utility functions (egoistic voting), but anticipating their
potentially ethical choice of labour supply. For the case of altruistic preferences, it would not
make much sense to use an egoistic utility function as the basis for voting decisions, since the
welfare of others enters directly in the actual utility function of the agent. If agents use their
full utility function, including the altruistic part when they vote, the voting becomes trivial as
all agents choose t¯ as their most preferred tax rate.
6. Conclusion
As we showed in the last section, the pattern of labour supply choices are very different when we
compare the more standard altruistic model with our proposed ethical behaviour. A main reason
for such differences come from the asymmetry we introduced in our behavioural assumptions.
When individuals are asked to pay more in taxes than they believed to be ethical, they respond
by avoiding taxes to prevent their tax liabilities from exceeding their ethical ones. However,
when they are asked to pay less that what they believe to be ethical, they do not provide more
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than the ethical labour supply to redistribute to others, which is what they do in the altruistic
case. We are not alone in making this kind of asymmetric assumption. In Bordignon (1990),
agents choose between evading taxes or not, and tax evasion only occurs if taxes are viewed as
being unfairly high. There is no attempt to pay more taxes when liabilities are viewed as being
lower than fair levels. One can say that the illegal aspect of tax evasion makes the ethics of tax
evasion different than that of tax avoidance, which is our concern. However, Bilodeau and Gravel
(2004) make that same type of asymmetric assumption in dealing with voluntary contributions
to public goods. Take their example of littering on the beach, which was also used in Laffont
(1975). Beach-goers face a prisoner dilemma in which trash reduces utility, but to dispose of it
is costly. With ethical behaviour comparable to the one used in this paper, no littering can be
sustained.
Among the potential extensions to this paper, the most natural one would be to consider more
than two types of individuals. Having only two types of agents guarantees that even without
personalized taxes, utilities can be equalized for the two types of agents because the tax system
has enough instruments. With more than two types, it would generally be impossible to do so.
Nevertheless, this would not change our results significatively provided individuals acknowledge
the limits of that tax system when assessing their ethical tax burden. All individuals in the
economy would agree on the ethical tax rate t¯, which would not necessarily lead to the full
equalization of utility, but that would still maximize the same social welfare function. The rest
of individual’s choices would be done in the same fashion.
Another natural extension, although conceptually more difficult, would be to introduce a public
good, say g, in the economy so that taxation (t, e) would finance both redistribution and public
good provision. Interestingly, it would be possible to compare the marginal cost of public funds
under egoistic preferences to that under ethical behaviour. Our first intuition is that since
labour supplies are less elastic under ethical behaviour, it is likely that the marginal cost of
public funds would be lower in that case. However, we have not been able to confirm that
intuition because the generalization of the assumed ethical behaviour of an individual facing
policies (t, e, g) is not a straightforward task. For example, how should individual k with ethical
views (tek, eek, gek, `ek,1, ..., `ek,n) behave when faced with (t, e, g) such that his actual net tax liability
is less than his ethical tax liability (twk`ek,k − e < tekwk`ek,k − eek) and when actual public good
provision is less than his ethical public good provision (g < gek)? It is necessary to answer this
and other difficult questions before we can extend the model to deal with the case in which a
government has several possible uses for the same dollar.
Finally, another interesting extension, also conceptually difficult, would be to introduce hetero-
geneity among agents in terms of ethics. This would amount to finding out whether there can
be more that one ethical tax rate. An easy way to do so would be to assume that when assessing
26
their ethical tax rate t¯, each individual maximizes a social welfare function that puts a weight
β < 1 on others. As a consequence, different individuals would have different t¯. This would
considerably reduce the likelihood that the first-best outcome can be reached in equilibrium.
Intuitively, if the poor believe they are entitled to more than what the rich view as fair to pay,
they will choose to avoid more. This will in turn put pressure on the rich’s tax burden, and
will induce them to avoid more. This approach implies that multiple visions of what ethical
behaviour is or should be may coexist in the same society.
Finally, an ambitious extension, which applies to the entire Kantian preference literature, would
be to derive the behaviour described in this paper as originating from a more primitive and/or
axiomatic framework. The goal would be to identify the class of preferences from which ethical
behaviour can potentially emerge, and that from which only standard egoistic behaviour is
possible.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The partially ethical labour supply is `?i (t, e) = (t¯wi ¯`i − t¯y¯ + e)/twi. The
cutoff tax rate t˜i is defined as the point where `?i (t˜i, e) = `i(t˜i). If we replace e by its equilibrium
value, we get that t˜i is given by
t˜i
[
wi`i(t˜i)−
niwi`i(t˜i) + njwj`j(t˜i)
n
]
= t¯
[
wi ¯`i −
niwi ¯`i + njwj ¯`j
n
]
,
where `j(t˜i) = ¯`j (by definition of t˜i). The equation describing t˜i can be re-written as:
t˜i[wi`i(t˜i)− wj ¯`j] = t¯[wi ¯`i − wj ¯`j].
Consider the first the determination of t˜1. From the last equation, t˜1 is given by
t˜1 = t¯
[
w2 ¯`2 − w1 ¯`1
w2 ¯`2 − w1`1(t˜1)
]
.
That t˜1 < t¯ follows from the fact that w1 ¯`1 > w1`1(t˜1) which in turn implies that w2 ¯`2−w1 ¯`1 <
w2 ¯`2 − w1`1(t˜1).
An analogous condition exists for t˜2 which implies that t˜2 > t¯.
Proof of Proposition 1: We solve for the Behavioural equilibrium labour supplies for all
possible tax rates. Consider first the case of t = t¯. The net tax payment for both types when
they supply ¯`i is given by t¯wi ¯`i − (t¯/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2 ¯`2]. Recall from equation (5) that all
agents facing such tax liabilities provide ¯`i.
Consider now the effect of reducing t on the equilibrium labour supplies, starting from t¯. The
tax liability of an individual of type 2 when she chooses ¯`2 is given by t(n1/n)[w2 ¯`2 − w1`1(t)].
Consequently, a decrease in the tax rate reduces her tax liability. This implies that for all tax
rate below t¯, individuals of type 2 continue to provide ¯`2. This in turn implies that for all
t ∈ [t˜1, t¯], an individual of type 1 chooses her labour supply as follows:
`?1(t) =
[
t¯
t
]
¯`1 −
[
t¯− t
t
]
w2 ¯`2
w1
.
When the tax t reaches t˜1, then `?1(t˜1) = `1(t˜1) and so, for all tax rates lower than t˜1, individuals
of type 1 supply `1(t).
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For tax rates above t¯, it is now individuals of type 1 who supply labour ethically, ¯`1 in their
case. Too see this, note that the net benefit of these individuals, i.e. t(n2/n)[w2`2(t)−w1 ¯`1], is
non-decreasing in the tax rate t unless:
∂`2(t)
∂t
> −
[w2`2(t)− w1 ¯`1]
tw2
.
In other words, the net benefit of the type 1 is non-decreasing in t provided the type 2 individuals
are not too reactive. Assuming this, individuals of type 1 provide ¯`1 for all tax rates above t˜1.
For all t ∈ [t¯, t˜2], individuals of type 2 supply labour such that:
`?2(t) =
[
t¯
t
]
¯`2 −
[
t¯− t
t
]
w1 ¯`1
w2
.
When t reaches t˜2, then `?2(t˜2) = `2(t˜2). For all tax rates above t˜2, individuals of type 2 supply
`2(t). Given behaviour of the two types of taxpayers in the Behavioural equilibrium and their net
tax liabilities, it is possible to write their indirect utility in terms of consumption as a function
of the prevailing tax rate t, denoted vi(t). We have:
v1(t) =



(1− t)w1`1(t) + (t/n)[n1w1`1(t) + n2w2 ¯`2]− h(`1(t)) if t ≤ t˜1
(1− t)w1`?1(t) + (t/n)[n1w1`?1(t) + n2w2 ¯`2]− h(`?1(t)) if t˜1 < t < t¯
(1− t¯)w1 ¯`1 + (t¯/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2 ¯`2]− h(¯`1) if t = t¯
(1− t)w1 ¯`1 + (t/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2`?2(t)]− h(¯`1) if t¯ < t < t˜2
(1− t)w1 ¯`1 + (t/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2`2(t)]− h(¯`1) if t˜2 ≤ t
v2(t) =



(1− t)w2 ¯`2 + (t/n)[n1w1`1(t) + n2w2 ¯`2]− h(¯`2) if t ≤ t˜1
(1− t)w2 ¯`2 + (t/n)[n1w1`?1(t) + n2w2 ¯`2]− h(¯`2) if t˜1 < t < t¯
(1− t¯)w2 ¯`2 + (t¯/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2 ¯`2]− h(¯`2) if t = t¯
(1− t)w2`?2(t) + (t/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2`?2(t)]− h(`?2(t)) if t¯ < t < t˜2
(1− t)w2`2(t) + (t/n)[n1w1 ¯`1 + n2w2`2(t)]− h(`2(t)) if t˜2 ≤ t
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